Kevin Ruddy v. (1) William Rae, Chief Constable of Strathclyde Police and (2) Elish Angiolini Q.C., the Lord Advocate [2011] CSIH 16

This action was an appeal against an interlocutor of the Sheriff Principal at Glasgow upholding a decision of the Sheriff, who had excluded certain averments of the pursuer and the appellant, and had excluded certain craves against the first and second defender.

The appellant had alleged that on 6 September 2004, officers of Strathclyde Police assaulted him in various ways, to his loss, injury and damage. Damages for the sum of £10,000 were sought. The appellant had also averred that the actings of the officers amounted to degrading treatment, incompatible with Article 3 ECHR. A subsequent enquiry into the actings of the officers was also criticised by the appellant, who had averred that the Lord Advocate was in breach of the Article 3 investigatory obligation, for failing to properly consider the matter and in deciding that no criminal proceedings should be brought against the officers.

The Inner House noted that the initial writ of the appellant amounted to somewhat of an "omnibus" of claims, all made against different defenders. The court noted that it amounted to one action, brought against two different defenders, with three distinctive juristic bases of claim being made. Despite this, and the fact that the Article 3 investigatory obligation breach was clearly a claim of administrative review and should have brought in the Court of Session, the court noted that neither of the defenders had raised incompetency grounds before the Sheriff. Indeed, the court noted that the Sheriff had been restricted to instead assessing the relevancy of the claims.

The court noted that the Scottish system of pleading does not, and should not, provide for a claim to address three distinct issues, distinguishable in fact and law, against two separate defenders, as in the present case. These types of omnibus pleadings, the court noted, would defeat the purpose of having rules of procedure, to avoid undue complexity and keep good order in the process of litigation. The Inner House noted that the matters raised in the action, particularly in relation to the alleged Article 3 breach, were of such fundamental importance and significance that the action fell to be dismissed as incompetent.