Description
A judge had not erred in refusing to exercise his discretion under the
Limitation Act 1980 to disapply the basic limitation period.
It was held that the judge did not determine that the claims had no reasonable prospect of success. He recognised that the appellant's description of the conditions of identified roadways over which they were obliged to walk for identifiable periods of their service underground might have been sufficient of itself to have established a
prima facie case of breach of statutory duty. He identified the issues which were likely to arise at any trial and the evidence which would be required to attempt to prove the case and to attempt to defend the claims. What the judge was rightly concerned to identify was the extent to which the enquiry would be hampered by the diminished cogency of the evidence available as a result of the long delay in bringing the claims. The judge's approach to the assessment of the broad merits was careful, conscientious and impeccable. The judge recorded a positive conclusion that post-limitation period delay had caused additional substantial prejudice to the employers and had had a serious impact upon the cogency of the evidence. He gave careful and principled consideration to the impact of delay upon the cogency of evidence bearing upon the issues in the litigation and there was no error in his approach.
